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uniform carbon tax that is applied to all emissions from all sectors and all countries; and that 
increases over time with the discount rate. For a one per cent pure rate of the time preference 
and a rate of risk aversion of one, the tax that maximises expected net present welfare equals 
$120/tC in 2010. However, we also find evidence that the uncertainty about welfare may well 
have fat tails so that the expectation exists only by virtue of the finite number of runs in our 
Monte Carlo analysis. This confirms Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem. We therefore consider 
minimax regret as a decision criterion. As regret is defined on the positive real line, we in fact 
consider large percentiles instead of the ill-defined maximum. Depending on the percentile 
used, the recommended tax lies between $100 and $170/tC. Regret is a measure of the slope 
of the welfare function, while we are in fact concerned about the level of welfare. We therefore 
minimise the tail risk, defined as the expected welfare below a percentile of the probability 
density function without climate policy. Depending of the percentile used, the recommended tax 
lies between $20 and $330/tC. We also minimise the fatness of the tails, as measured by the p-
value of the test of the hypothesis that recursive mean welfare is stationary in the number of 
Monte Carlo runs. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary at the 5% confidence 
level, but come closest for an initial tax of $50/tC. All four alternative decision criteria rapidly 
improve as modest taxes are introduced, but gradually deteriorate if the tax is too high. That 
implies that the appropriate tax is an interior solution. In stark contrast to some of the 
interpretations of the Dismal Theorem, we find that fat tails by no means justify arbitrarily large 
carbon taxes. 
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Climate Policy Under Fat-Tailed Risk: An Application of FUND 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Weitzman‘s Dismal Theorem (Weitzman 2009) challenged the quantitative economic 
analysis of climate policy: The uncertainty about the impacts of climate change would 
be so large that expected utility maximisation is either undefined or arbitrary. 
Unfortunately, Weitzman‘s is an impossibility theorem: It shows what cannot be 
done. It does not provide an alternative criterion that can be used to make decisions 
about climate change policy or indeed policy in any area that is characterised by fat-
tailed risks. This paper attempts to fill this gap and suggest ways to use quantitative 
economic analysis to support climate change policy decisions. 
(Weitzman 2009) was not the first economist to question the applicability of cost-
benefit analysis (in the broad sense of the word) to climate change, but his paper is the 
most sophisticated. (van den Bergh 2004), for instance, qualitatively reiterates a 
number of objections to welfare maximisation as a guide to policy on a problem as 
uncertain, diffuse, and complex as climate change. (Nordhaus 2009) argues that 
Weitzman‘s result exposes the limitations of a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
utility function (Geweke 2001) rather than the limitations of cost-benefit analysis of 
greenhouse gas emission reduction. (Tol 2003), on the other hand, cannot exclude the 
possibility of impacts so disastrous that they overwhelm the assumptions and 
approximations typically made in applied research on climate change. (Yohe 2003) 
argues that policy may overcome this. Particularly, Tol‘s disaster is a climate-change-
induced collapse of a regional economy, which may be prevented by development 
policy and international transfers of money. (Tol and Yohe 2007) offer qualified 
support for this position. 
Naively interpreted, the Dismal Theorem calls for an arbitrarily high carbon tax 
(Weitzman 2009). (Hennlock 2009), on the other hand, argues that fossil fuels are a 
necessary good, at least in the short run, and under such an interpretation immediate 
draconian climate policy would have disastrous implications for economic activity, 
including food production (Tol and Yohe 2006). The cure (immediate drastic 
emission reductions) may be worse than the disease (the impacts from climate 
change). It follows that the carbon tax should not be set at an arbitrarily high level 
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because an extremely high carbon tax would itself be a disaster. Climate policy 
analysis should therefore strike a balance between two potential catastrophes. 
(Raiffa 1968) argues that minimax regret is an appropriate alternative decision 
criterion if expected utility is undefined. (Froyn 2005;Loulou and Kanudia 1999) are 
the only ones to apply the minimax regret decision criterion to greenhouse gas 
emission abatement policies.1 We follow their lead, but pay particular attention to the 
concepts of ―worst case‖ and ―maximum regret‖. This is not a trivial problem because 
outcomes are defined on the real line, while the number of numerical realisations from 
a model is necessarily bounded. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses three alternative decision 
criteria for decision making with fat tails, and decision support using a numerical 
model. In Section 3, we present the numerical model used here. We use the model to 
illustrate the fat tails in Section 4. Section 5 shows the results of the decision analysis. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Decision making with fat tails 
Savage‘s minimax regret (Savage 1951) is the standard approach to decision making 
with fat tails (Raiffa, H. 68). It can be applied by using the following steps. First, 
think of the set of all possible policies to address the problem in question. In the case 
of climate change, each element of the policy set could be a specific carbon tax 
schedule. Second, for each state of the world find the policy that maximises welfare 
for that specific state of the world. Welfare here is defined as the conventional 
measure of net present value of population weighted average per capita consumption. 
Third, compare how each policy from the policy set compares to the welfare 
maximising policy in each state of the world in terms of welfare. The difference in 
welfare between the welfare maximising policy and the policy under consideration is 
called the regret from a specific policy for a specific state of the world. By definition, 
regret is positive; and there is at least one policy with zero regret. For each policy, one 
then finds the state of the world where the regret for this policy is highest. This is the 
maximum regret for a specific policy. The final decision rule states that one should 
pick the policy that has the lowest maximum regret. 
                                                 
1 Note that (Hof et al. 2010) do a cost-benefit analysis under worst-case assumptions, incorrectly 
referring to this as minimax regret. 
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In applied numerical analysis a number of issues arise. First, the policy set might 
consist of a continuum of policy choices. A carbon tax, for example, is a real number. 
Computational constraints put limits on how many specific policies, i.e. carbon taxes, 
one can analyse. In practise this problem is easily solved by approximating this with 
carbon taxes that increase in small discrete steps. 
The second problem is that ―maximum regret‖ is not properly defined in a 
numerical analysis. Strictly speaking, in a Monte Carlo analysis with N runs, the 
observed maximum regret is the regret at the (1-1/N)
th
 percentile. Therefore, we 
replace ―minimax regret‖ with ―minipercentile regret‖ in practice, minimising the αth 
percentile of regret. We do this for a range of αs. Confidence in estimates of large 
percentiles is low (Boos 1984;Weissman 1978), so we steer clear of the largest 
percentiles. 
The third issue concerns the core of the decision criterion itself. The switch from 
welfare maximisation to regret minimisation is not innocuous. The regret decision 
criterion normalizes welfare of particular policy choices by ―doing the best we can, 
given the circumstances‖. The difference between the welfare optimum in any 
particular state of the world and welfare for any other non-optimal policy in the same 
state of the world is less sensitive to parameter variations than the absolute welfare 
level itself. Regret is a measure of the slope of the welfare function along variations in 
policy. However, the minimax regret rule does not guarantee that welfare is above 
some acceptable absolute level. To paraphrase Churchill, sometimes it is not enough 
to do your best; you should do what it takes. 
Let us consider two examples. In the first, welfare is CRRA in consumption and 
consumption may approach zero. In the second example, there is a floor to either 
welfare – as in (Weitzman 2009) – or consumption – e.g., through charity as in (Tol 
and Yohe 2007). In a disastrous state of the world, in the first example, welfare is 
large and negative while regret is large and positive. In the second example, welfare is 
large and negative but regret is small. Yet, the small progress made by policy in the 
disastrous scenario may be more important that the larger progress possible in less 
extreme scenarios. 
Therefore, we propose two alternative decision rules. The first is straightforward. 
We are worried about the fat left tail of welfare. We should therefore minimise the 
risk in that tail. We define the tail as everything below the αth percentile; and tail risk 
as 
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where R is the tail risk, α0 is the cut-off point for what constitutes the tail of the 
welfare probability density function for the no policy scenario (t=0), Wt is net present 
welfare for a particular carbon tax profile t, and f(W) is the probability density 
function of welfare. We do this for a range of cut-off points (α<0.5). Note that the tail 
risk coincides with expected welfare for α=1. As we only consider the left tail, we 
seek to minimise tail risk. 
The third decision rule goes to the root of the problem. If fat tails are the problem, 
then one should choose policy such that the tail is thin or least-fat. This requires a 
definition of a fat tail. If the tail is fat, the mean would not converge to a constant 
value as the sample size increases, but vary instead. A probability density function is 
said to be stationary if it is constant over time, that is, if its moments converge. One 
typically tests for stationarity of the first moment (mean) only. Here, we are not 
interested in changes over time, but rather in changes over the sample size. We refer 
to this as Monte Carlo stationarity. We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for 
stationarity, swapping time and sample size. That is, we estimate 
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where Wn is net present welfare in Monte Carlo run n. We test the hypothesis δ=0. We 
minimise the p-value of the ADF test, that is, reject the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity as strongly as we can. 
 
3. The model 
We use the integrated assessment model FUND to assess climate policy under fat-
tailed risk using the two proposed decision criteria. We compare the results to those 
for the ―standard‖ minipercentile regret as well as to maximum expected utility. In 
many ways, FUND is a standard integrated assessment model (Guo et al. 2006;Tol 
1997;Tol 1999;Tol 2006). It has simple representations of the demography, economy, 
energy, emissions, and emission reduction policies for 16 regions. It has simple 
representations of the cycles of greenhouse gases, radiative forcing, climate, and sea 
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level rise. In other ways, though, FUND is unique. It is alone in the detail of its 
representation of the impacts of climate change. Impacts on agriculture, forestry, 
water use, energy use, the coastal zone, hurricanes, ecosystems, and health are all 
modelled separately—both in ―physical‖ units and their monetary value (Tol 
2002a;Tol 2002b). Moreover, FUND allows vulnerability to climate change impacts 
to be an explicit function of the level and rate of regional development (Tol 2005;Tol 
et al. 2007). 
This paper uses version 3.6 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, 
Negotiation and Distribution (FUND). Version 3.6 of FUND corresponds to version 
1.6 (Tol et al. 1999;Tol 2001;Tol 2002c) except for the impact module described in 
(Link and Tol 2004;Narita et al. 2009a;Narita et al. 2010;Tol 2002a;Tol 2002b) and 
carbon cycle feedbacks taken from (Tol 2009). A full list of papers, the source code, 
and the technical documentation for the model can be found online at 
http://www.fund-model.org/. 
The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of 
America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, 
Central America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. The model runs from 1950 to 3000 in 
time steps of one year. The prime reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate 
change impact module.  In FUND, the impacts of climate change are assumed to 
depend on the impact of the previous year, this way reflecting the process of 
adjustment to climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the year 1950 
cannot be approximated very well, both physical and monetized impacts of climate 
change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of the model runs.2 The 
centuries after the 21
st
 are included to assess the long-term implications of climate 
change. Previous versions of the model stopped at 2300. 
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of 
                                                 
2 The period of 1950–2000 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the IMAGE 100-
year database (Batjes and Goldewijk 1994). The scenario for the period 2010–2100 is based on the 
EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al. 
1992). The 2000–2010 period is interpolated from the immediate past (http://earthtrends.wri.org), and 
the period 2100–3000 extrapolated. 
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the energy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of 
carbon dioxide from land use change, methane and nitrous oxide. The scenarios of 
economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of climatic change. 
Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that result from 
changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and storms. Heat and cold stress are 
assumed to have an effect only on the elderly, non-reproductive population. In 
contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect the number of births. Heat stress 
only affects the urban population. The share of the urban population among the total 
population is based on the World Resources Databases (http://earthtrends.wri.org). It 
is extrapolated based on the statistical relationship between urbanization and per 
capita income, which are estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995. 
Climate-induced migration between the regions of the world also causes the 
population sizes to change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and 
completely with the respective host population. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride, the global mean 
temperature, the impact of carbon dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on 
emissions, and the impact of the damages to the economy and the population caused 
by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and 
then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, 
measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by a five-box model 
(Hammitt et al. 1992;Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann 1987), extended with a dynamic 
biosphere (Tol 2009): If it gets sufficiently warm, terrestrial vegetations, currently a 
sink of carbon dioxide, turns into a source of emissions. The model also contains 
sulphur emissions (Tol 2006). 
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur 
hexafluoride and sulphur aerosols is as in the IPCC (Ramaswamy et al. 2001). The 
global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium 
(determined by the radiative forcing RF), with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, 
the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 3.0°C for a doubling of carbon 
dioxide equivalents. Regional temperatures follow from multiplying the global mean 
temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern 
averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al. 2000). The global mean sea level is also 
geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 
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500 years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best 
guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario (Kattenberg et al. 1996). 
The climate impact module (Tol 2002a;Tol 2002b) includes the following 
categories: agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory 
disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, 
diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, unmanaged ecosystems, and tropical 
and extra tropical storms. The last two are new additions (Narita et al. 2008;Narita et 
al. 2009b). Climate change related damages can be attributed to either the rate of 
change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of change (benchmarked at 1.0°C). 
Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation (Tol 
2002b). 
People can die prematurely due to climate change, or they can migrate because of 
sea level rise. Like all impacts of climate change, these effects are monetized. The 
value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita income. The 
resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed range of values in 
the literature (Cline 1992). The value of emigration is set to be 3 times the per capita 
income (Tol 1995), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income in 
the host region (Cline 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are 
modeled explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland 
was on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (Fankhauser 1994). Dryland 
value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses are 
valued at $2 million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 
(Fankhauser 1994). The wetland value is assumed to have logistic relation to per 
capita income. Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the 
value of additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes and subsequent 
coastal squeeze. 
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, storm 
damage, and ecosystems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an 
intermediate layer of impacts measured in their ‗natural‘ units (Tol 2002a). Impacts of 
climate change on energy consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and 
respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which is 
determined by a variety of factors, including plant physiology and the behaviour of 
farmers. Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether the actual climate 
conditions are moving closer to or away from that optimum climate. Impacts are 
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larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the optimum climate. The 
optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential impacts. The actual 
impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation. The 
impacts of not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative (Tol 
2002b). 
The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, tropical and 
extratropical storm damage, unmanaged ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea 
malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple power functions. 
Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign (Tol 2002b). 
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic 
growth, and technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more 
vulnerable, such as water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders 
(with urbanization), and ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). 
Other systems such as energy consumption (with technological progress), agriculture 
(with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases (with improved health 
care) are projected to become less vulnerable at least over the long term (Tol 2002b). 
The income elasticities (Tol 2002b) are estimated from cross-sectional data or taken 
from the literature. 
Welfare of a particular state of the world is defined as the sum over time of 
population weighted utility of world average per capita consumption, discounted at a 
pure rate of time preference of 1% per year. Utility is defined as the natural logarithm 
of per capita consumption. In both choices we follow the standard utilitarian 
assumption commonly used in economic analysis of climate change policy. 
All parameters in the model (almost 900) are uncertain and assume a probability 
density function. These PDFs are occasionally derived from meta-analyses of 
published estimates, but more often based on ―expert guesses‖. The PDFs are 
assumed to be independent of one another. However, in those cases where there is a 
known relationship between parameters, we model that relationship and assume a 
PDF for the hyperparameters. For instance, the climate sensitivity and the rate of 
energy dissipation in the ocean are related and jointly constrained by the observed 
warming. Instead of assuming a correlation between the parameters, we have that the 
rate of energy dissipation is an uncertain function of the climate sensitivity (itself an 
uncertain parameter) and the observed warming. 
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Unlike DICE (Nordhaus 2008) and PAGE (Hope 2008), FUND does not assume 
that there is a probability of disastrous impacts of climate change. Rather, we vary all 
parameters randomly and it so happens that particular realisations are catastrophic. 
The fat tails found in the Monte Carlo analyses in FUND are a result, rather than an 
assumption. 
 
4. Fat tails in a numerical model 
We run the model 10,000 times3 in a Monte Carlo analysis. Figure 1 shows the 
probability density function (PDF) of the net present welfare, assuming a 1% pure rate 
of time preference and a rate of risk aversion of unity. The PDF is clearly not a 
Normal distribution. There is a plateau in the middle, with two tails. The left hand tail, 
which contains the bad outcomes, drops linearly at first and then turns to become fat – 
at least graphically. 
Figure 1 also shows that the PDF is very noisy. The 10,000 realisations were put 
in 400 bins. One would expect a relatively smooth curve, particularly in the middle of 
the distribution. Instead, Figure 1 shows that there is little confidence in the estimates 
of the number of realisations per bin. 
This is confirmed by Figure 3. Figure 3 shows the estimate of the expected value 
of the net present welfare for the first 1000 realisations in the Monte Carlo analysis, 
the first 1001 realisations, the first 1002 realisations, and so on. The recursive mean 
drifts up and down, even with 9,000 or more realisations. The augmented Dickey-
Fuller test reveals the same. The hypothesis δ=0 in Equation (2) has a p-value of 
0.104 – that is, there is a 10.4% probability of obtaining the realisations of the 
recursive mean welfare if the underlying process is non-stationary. Normally, this 
means non-rejection of the null hypothesis, so that we have to work with the 
assumption that the mean is Monte Carlo non-stationary. Hence, the left tail is fat. 
FUND displays the behaviour predicted by Weitzman. 
Figure 1 further shows the PDF of net present welfare for two policy scenarios. In 
the first scenario, a carbon tax of $50/tC is levied on all greenhouse gases in all 
regions in 2010. After 2010, the carbon tax increases with the interest rate. This 
continues until the radiative forcing is stabilised, after which the carbon tax falls with 
                                                 
3 Recall that the law of large numbers is independent of the dimensionality or complexity of the data 
generating process. 
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one-tenth of the interest rate.4 In the second policy scenario, the initial carbon tax is 
$500/tC. Figure 2 shows the difference in the PDFs. 
An initial carbon tax of $50/tC, rising with the interest rate until radiative forcing 
is stabilized, would shift the PDF of net present welfare to the right. This is most 
clearly seen in Figure 2: the chance of low welfare decreases, and the chance of high 
welfare increases. Figure 1 reveals that the worrisomely fat left tail is largely cut off. 
Raising the initial carbon tax to $500/tC does not have a clear impact in Figure 1. 
Figure 2, however, shows that a high carbon tax thins the right tail: There is a smaller 
chance of large welfare. The carbon tax is sufficiently high to prevent rapid economic 
growth. A high initial carbon tax also thickens the left tail. While a modest carbon tax 
reduces the probability of low welfare as climate change and its impacts are less 
pronounced, a high carbon tax increases the probability of low welfare as the costs of 
emission reduction escalate and substantially slow down economic growth. Even 
though FUND corroborates the Dismal Theorem, it does not advocate an arbitrarily 
high carbon tax. Put differently, these results reveal that there is dangerous climate 
change as well as dangerous climate policy. 
Figure 3 shows the recursive mean welfare as a function of the sample size for the 
two policy scenarios. The mean does not converge at a constant, but is considerably 
less volatile. For an initial carbon tax of $50/tC, the p-value of the ADF test is 0.062 – 
lower than without climate policy, but the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is 
rejected at the 10% level only. For an initial carbon tax of $500/tC, the p-value is 
0.075. A high tax increases the non-stationarity of the recursive mean, and thus the 
fatness of the tail. This again shows that a very high carbon tax makes matters worse 
rather than better. 
These results are indicative and illustrative. The next section puts these tentative 
findings on a firmer footing. 
 
5. Robust taxes for greenhouse gas emissions 
We repeated the Monte Carlo analysis, with 10,000 runs, for initial carbon taxes 
between $0/tC and $500/tC, in steps of $10/tC. This took 84 hours on an i7 2.67GHz 
processor with 4 GB RAM. The Monte Carlo analysis formed the outer loop, and the 
                                                 
4 The rate of the decline of the carbon tax was set by trail and error; the chosen rate ensures that 
greenhouse gas concentrations do not increase. 
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carbon taxes formed the parallelised inner loop so that the parameter realisations 
across the policy scenarios were identical. 
Figure 4 shows expected welfare as a function of the initial carbon tax.5 Expected 
welfare rapidly rises with modest carbon taxes, but it turns and gently slopes down if 
carbon taxes are too high. The expected welfare maximising, initial carbon tax is 
$120/tC. The shape of the objective function shown in Figure 4 makes clear that 
adopting a tax that is too stringent is less costly than adopting a tax that is too lenient. 
Figure 4 also shows selected percentiles of the PDF of regret.6 The same pattern 
emerges as for the mean. A modest carbon tax sharply cuts regret, but very high 
carbon taxes cause slightly more regret. The minimedian regret tax is $100/tC. The 
minipercentile (75) regret tax is also $100/tC. This increases to $140/tC for the 90
th
 
percentile; and to $170/tC for the 95
th
, 99
th
 and 99.5
th
. For the 99.9
th
 percentile, the 
minipercentile regret tax falls to $100/tC. Figure 4 reveals that the confidence in 
estimate of the 99.9%ile (the hundredth-smallest realisation) is not great. For each 
percentile, we find evidence that very high carbon taxes thicken the left tail. 
Comparing the taxes across the percentiles suggests that choosing a higher percentile 
does not necessarily imply a higher carbon, which again underlines the risks of a 
climate policy that is overly stringent. That said, the asymmetry of the objective 
functions suggests that it is better to err on the conservative side. 
Figure 5 shows the tail risk as a function of the initial carbon tax. As in Figure 4, 
we show the 50
th
, 75
th
, 90
th
, 95
th
, 99
th
, 99.5
th
 and 99.9
th
 percentile. As above, the 
decision criterion improves rapidly in value for modest taxes, and deteriorates gently 
if the tax is greater than the recommended one. The risk in the ―whole tail‖ – that is, 
everything below the median of the no policy distribution – is minimum for an initial 
carbon tax of $150/tC. The minimum tail risk tax is lower for a narrower definition of 
the tail: $110/tC for the 75
th
 and 90
th
 percentile. This is because the costs of emission 
reduction shift the welfare distribution to the right. The minimum tail risk tax 
increases again, to $120/tC, if the tail is confined to the 95
th
 percentile. If we consider 
                                                 
5 Note that we numerically derive the entire objective function instead of finding its optimum through 
successive approximations of the objective function; we do this for the four alternative decision criteria 
considered in this paper. 
6 Recall that the definition of regret requires that the optimum tax be found for each state of the world, 
that is 10,000 times in our case. We saved the value of the objective function for each state of the world 
and each tax. This is possible as we defined policy such that it can be characterised by a single number 
(the initial tax) and as discretised that initial tax. 
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only the tip of the tail (99%ile), the tax is much higher: $330/tC. However, the very 
tip of the tail behaves differently again. The risk above the 99.5%ile is essentially flat 
for a tax greater than $100/tC. The risk above the 99.9%ile is zero (in our numerical 
analysis) for an initial tax of $20/tC or greater. 
The minimum tail risk decision criterion, while intuitive – ―chop off the 
worrisome tail‖ – does not provide clear guidance because the definition of the tail is 
ambiguous, but more importantly because climate policy would redistribute risks 
within the tail. 
Figure 6 displays the p-value for the test for non-stationarity of the recursive mean 
of net present value as a function of the initial carbon tax. As above, a modest tax 
rapidly thins the tail but the tail slowly grows thicker again as the tax gets too high. 
The p-value is minimum for an initial tax of $110/tC. However, the p-value is still 
0.064, which indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the recursive mean is 
Monte Carlo non-stationary. However, it is as close we can get to a thin tail. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we seek to find the policy implications of Weitzman‘s Dismal Theorem. 
Superficially, the Dismal Theorem calls for a climate policy that is arbitrarily 
stringent, or a carbon tax that is arbitrarily high. We show that this interpretation is 
incorrect. The risks of climate change fall rapidly as climate policy gets more 
stringent; but the risks of climate policy increase slowly too and eventually overtake 
the risks of inaction. 
A more careful interpretation of the Dismal Theorem is that expected welfare 
maximisation is not applicable to a problem like climate change. If it were, our model 
would recommend a carbon tax on all greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors and 
all countries of $120/tC in 2010, and rising with the interest rate thereafter. 
Minimax regret is the standard decision criterion under deep uncertainty. In this 
case, regret is defined on the non-negative real line; and the maximum is undefined. 
We therefore minimise selective percentiles of the regret distribution. For all 
percentiles considered, the minipercentile regret tax lies strictly between $100/tC and 
$170/tC – that is, the carbon tax can be too high as well as too low. The tax initially 
increases as more extreme percentiles are considered, but appears to bend back for the 
highest percentiles. 
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Minimax regret and minipercentile regret taxes are the best one can do given the 
circumstances. However, sometimes one needs to do what it takes. We therefore 
introduce two alternative decision criteria. The first is to minimise the risk in the tail 
of the distribution of welfare without policy. Intuitively, we chop off the worrisome 
tail. We again find interior solutions only (between $20 and $330/tC), rejecting the 
notion of an arbitrarily high tax. However, this criterion does not provide clear 
guidance as the definition of the ―tail‖ is arbitrary and climate policy not only thins 
the tail but redistributes probability mass within the tail as well. 
Fat-tailed distributions have moments that vary with the sample size in a Monte 
Carlo analysis. We therefore introduce a new decision criterion – the tax that 
maximises the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of Monte Carlo non-
stationarity of the recursive mean. Once more, there is an interior solution, and a 
unique one at that: $50/tC. Moderate carbon taxes thin the tails, but overly stringent 
climate policy thickens the tails again. We find that while there is a tax that minimises 
the thickness of the tail, there is no tax that rejected the hypothesis of a thick tail with 
95% confidence. 
In sum, our numerical experiments corroborate the Dismal Theorem, showing that 
the left tail of the welfare distribution is thick with and without climate policy. 
Furthermore, we provide guidance on the appropriate level of a carbon tax, argue 
against the notion the appropriate level of the carbon tax is arbitrary, and strongly 
reject the notion that the carbon tax should be arbitrarily high. We find that there is 
dangerous climate change as well as dangerous climate policy; and that the 
appropriate carbon tax is bounded from below as well as from above. Our model 
suggests a range of $20-330/tC. 
The results come with a number of caveats. The policy implications should be 
treated as indicative only until the analysis here is replicated with additional 
scenarios, with alternative specifications of the welfare function and its parameters, 
and with other models. The analysis should also be repeated with additional policy 
instruments, particularly income transfers (which may be used to prevent economic 
collapse) and geoengineering (which may be used to prevent climate change). 
Furthermore, we disregard learning. All these matters are deferred to future research. 
 
 15 
Acknowledgements 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ESOP Workshop on Climate and 
Distribution, Oslo, 22-23 June 2010; we are grateful to the participants for a useful 
discussion. Martin Weitzman also had useful comments on an earlier version of the 
paper. Financial support by the ClimateCost project is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
References 
Batjes, J.J. and C.G.M.Goldewijk (1994), The IMAGE 2 Hundred Year (1890-1990) 
Database of the Global Environment (HYDE) 410100082 ,RIVM, Bilthoven. 
 
Boos, D.D. (1984), 'Using Extreme Value Theory to Estimate Large Percentiles', 
Technometrics, 26, (1), 33-39. 
 
Cline, W.R. (1992), Global Warming - The Benefits of Emission Abatement ,OECD, 
Paris. 
 
Fankhauser, S. (1994), 'Protection vs. Retreat -- The Economic Costs of Sea Level 
Rise', Environment and Planning A, 27, 299-319. 
 
Froyn, C.B. (2005), 'Decision criteria, scientific uncertainty, and the global warming 
controversy', Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 10, (2), pp. 
183-211. 
 
Geweke, J. (2001), 'A note on some limitations of CRRA utility', Economics Letters, 
71, (3), pp. 341-345. 
 
Guo, J., C.J.Hepburn, R.S.J.Tol, and D.Anthoff (2006), 'Discounting and the Social 
Cost of Climate Change: A Closer Look at Uncertainty', Environmental Science & 
Policy, 9, 205-216. 
 
Hammitt, J.K., R.J.Lempert, and M.E.Schlesinger (1992), 'A Sequential-Decision 
Strategy for Abating Climate Change', Nature, 357, 315-318. 
 
Hennlock, M. (2009), Robust Control in Global Warming Management: An 
Analytical Dynamic Integrated Assessment, Working Papers in Economics 354 
,Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg. 
 
Hof, A.F., M.J.G.den Elzen, and D.P.van Vuuren (2010), 'A Quantitative Minimax 
Regret Approach to Climate Change: Does Discounting Still Matter?', Ecological 
Economics (in press). 
 
Hope, C.W. (2008), 'Optimal Carbon Emissions and the Social Cost of Carbon over 
Time under Uncertainty', Integrated Assessment Journal, 8, (1), 107-122. 
 
Kattenberg, A., F.Giorgi, H.Grassl, G.A.Meehl, J.F.B.Mitchell, R.J.Stouffer, 
T.Tokioka, A.J.Weaver, and T.M.L.Wigley (1996), 'Climate Models - Projections of 
Future Climate', in Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change -- 
  
 
16 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1 edn, J.T. Houghton et al. (eds.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 285-357. 
 
Leggett, J., W.J.Pepper, and R.J.Swart (1992), 'Emissions Scenarios for the IPCC: An 
Update', in Climate Change 1992 - The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific 
Assessment, 1 edn, vol. 1 J.T. Houghton, B.A. Callander, and S.K. Varney (eds.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 71-95. 
 
Link, P.M. and R.S.J.Tol (2004), 'Possible economic impacts of a shutdown of the 
thermohaline circulation: an application of FUND', Portuguese Economic Journal, 3, 
(2), 99-114. 
 
Loulou, R. and A.Kanudia (1999), 'Minimax regret strategies for greenhouse gas 
abatement: methodology and application', Operations Research Letters, 25, (5), pp. 
219-230. 
 
Maier-Reimer, E. and K.Hasselmann (1987), 'Transport and Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide in the Ocean: An Inorganic Ocean Circulation Carbon Cycle Model', Climate 
Dynamics, 2, 63-90. 
 
Mendelsohn, R.O., W.N.Morrison, M.E.Schlesinger, and N.G.Andronova (2000), 
'Country-specific market impacts of climate change', Climatic Change, 45, (3-4), 553-
569. 
 
Narita, D., D.Anthoff, and R.S.J.Tol (2008), Damage Costs of Climate Change 
through Intensification of Tropical Cyclone Activities: An Application of FUND, 
Working Paper 259 ,Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin. 
 
Narita, D., D.Anthoff, and R.S.J.Tol (2009a), 'Damage Costs of Climate Change 
through Intensification of Tropical Cyclone Activities: An Application of FUND', 
Climate Research, 39, pp. 87-97. 
 
Narita, D., D.Anthoff, and R.S.J.Tol (2009b), Economic Costs of Extratropical 
Storms under Climate Change: An Application of FUND, Working Paper 274 
,Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin. 
 
Narita, D., D.Anthoff, and R.S.J.Tol (2010), 'Economic Costs of Extratropical Storms 
under Climate Change: An Application of FUND', Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management, 53, (3), pp. 371-384. 
 
Nordhaus, W.D. (2008), A Question of Balance -- Weighing the Options on Global 
Warming Policies Yale University Press, New Haven. 
 
Nordhaus, W.D. (2009), An Analysis of the Dismal Theorem, mimeo ,Department of 
Economics, Yale University, New Haven. 
 
Raiffa, H. (1968), Decision Analysis Reading, Addison-Wesley. 
 
 17 
Ramaswamy, V., O.Boucher, J.Haigh, D.Hauglustaine, J.Haywood, G.Myhre, 
T.Nakajima, G.Y.Shi, and S.Solomon (2001), 'Radiative Forcing of Climate Change', 
in Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis -- Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, J.T. 
Houghton and Y. Ding (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 349-416. 
 
Savage, L.J. (1951), 'The Theory of Statistical Decision', Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 46, (253), 55-67. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (1995), 'The Damage Costs of Climate Change Toward More 
Comprehensive Calculations', Environmental and Resource Economics, 5, (4), 353-
374. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (1997), 'On the Optimal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An 
Application of FUND', Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 2, 151-163. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (1999), 'The Marginal Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions', Energy 
Journal, 20, (1), 61-81. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2001), 'Equitable Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change', Ecological 
Economics, 36, (1), 71-85. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2002a), 'Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change - Part 1: 
Benchmark Estimates', Environmental and Resource Economics, 21, (1), 47-73. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2002b), 'Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change - Part II: 
Dynamic Estimates', Environmental and Resource Economics, 21, (2), 135-160. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2002c), 'Welfare Specifications and Optimal Control of Climate Change: 
an Application of FUND', Energy Economics, 24, 367-376. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2003), 'Is the uncertainty about climate change too large for expected 
cost-benefit analysis?', Climatic Change, 56, (3), 265-289. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2005), 'Emission Abatement versus Development as Strategies to Reduce 
Vulnerability to Climate Change: An Application of FUND', Environment and 
Development Economics, 10, (5), 615-629. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2006), 'Multi-Gas Emission Reduction for Climate Change Policy: An 
Application of FUND', Energy Journal (Multi-Greenhouse Gas Mitigation and 
Climate Policy Special Issue), 235-250. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2009), Climate Feedbakcs on the Terrestrial Biosphere and the Economics 
of Climate Policy: An Application of FUND, Working Paper 288 ,Economic and 
Social Research Institute, Dublin. 
 
Tol, R.S.J., T.E.Downing, and N.Eyre (1999), The Marginal Costs of Radiatively-
Active Gases W99/32 ,Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, 
Amsterdam. 
  
 
18 
Tol, R.S.J., K.L.Ebi, and G.W.Yohe (2007), 'Infectious Disease, Development, and 
Climate Change: A Scenario Analysis', Environment and Development Economics, 
12, 687-706. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. and G.W.Yohe (2006), 'Of Dangerous Climate Change and Dangerous 
Emission Reduction', in Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, H.-J. Schellnhuber et 
al. (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 291-298. 
 
Tol, R.S.J. and G.W.Yohe (2007), 'Infinite Uncertainty, Forgotten Feedbacks, and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change', Climatic Change, 83, (4), 429-442. 
 
van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (2004), 'Optimal climate policy is a utopia: from quantitative 
to qualitative cost-benefit analysis', Ecological Economics, 48, 385-393. 
 
Weissman, I. (1978), 'Estimation of Parameters and Larger Quantiles based on the k 
Largest Observations', Journal of the American Statistical Association, 73, (364), 
812-815. 
 
Weitzman, M.L. (2009), 'On Modelling and Interpreting the Economics of 
Catastrophic Climate Change', Review of Economics and Statistics, 91, (1), 1-19. 
 
Yohe, G.W. (2003), 'More trouble for cost-benefit analysis', Climatic Change, 56, 
235-244. 
 
 
 19 
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
8
.0
0
E
+
1
2
8
.3
0
E
+
1
2
8
.6
0
E
+
1
2
8
.9
0
E
+
1
2
9
.2
0
E
+
1
2
9
.5
0
E
+
1
2
9
.8
0
E
+
1
2
1
.0
1
E
+
1
3
1
.0
4
E
+
1
3
1
.0
7
E
+
1
3
1
.1
0
E
+
1
3
$0/tC
$50/tC
$500/tC
 
Figure 1. The probability density function of the net present value of global welfare 
for the case without climate policy, and with an initial carbon tax of $50/tC and 
$500/tC. 
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Figure 2. The difference in the probability density function between no climate policy 
and an initial carbon tax of $50/tC, and between a $50/tC and a $500/tC carbon tax.
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Figure 3. The expected value of the net present value of global welfare as a function 
of the Monte Carlo sample size for the case without climate policy, and with an initial 
carbon tax of $50/tC and $500/tC. 
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Figure 4. The expected net present value of global welfare (right axis) and selected 
percentiles of the regret distribution (left axis) as a function of the initial carbon tax. 
The unshaded area comprises minipercentile regret taxes.
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Figure 5. The tail risk of the net present value of global welfare for selected 
definitions of the tail as a function of the initial carbon tax. The unshaded area 
comprises minimum tail risk taxes. 
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Figure 6. The probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that the recursive mean of  
the net present value of global welfare is Monte-Carlo-stationary as a function of the 
initial carbon tax. 
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